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KANT CHASTENED BUT VINDICATED:
REJOINDER TO FORGIE
William F. Vallicella

I have defended the quasi-Kantian thesis that the cosmological argument for
lhe existence of God depends for its probativeness on the ontological argument
from possibility. William Forgie finds my case for this thesis unconvincing.
This rejoinder clarifies my position and rebuts Forgie's counterarguments.

I thank Professor Forgie for his thoughtful response to my article.!
Although Forgie has convincingly shown that Kant was wrong to hold that
the cosmological argument (CA) depends on the ontological argument
(OA) from mere concepts, I maintain that a quasi-Kantian dependency thesis
is nevertheless defensible: the CA depends on the OA from possibility in a
way that renders the CA superfluous as an independent proof of the ens
realissimum (ER), whatever independent value the CA may have as a proof
of some metaphysical ground or other of the contingent existent. I will
assume that the reader knows what sort of CA is at issue here, and what an
OA from possibility is, either from my original article2 or from Forgie's
response to it. What must be emphasized, however, is that my dependency
thesis concerns probativeness and not soundness - a point that Forgie
appears not to properly appreciate despite his paying lip service to it. I am
in part to blame for this misapprehension on his part given my incautious
remarks about presupposition in an endnote, a point to which I shall return
below. Nevertheless, probativeness is central since the theistic proofs were
originally advanced not as exercises in logic, but as serious attempts to
know something about God by human reason unaided by revelation.
1. The Dependency Thesis Restated

A probative argument is one that actually generates knowledge for a truthseeker. Thus probativeness is not a narrowly logical property, but a logicalcum-epistemological one. Knowledge, however, necessarily involves a
knower; any inquiry into the probative force (Beweiskraft) of an argument,
therefore, treats of arguments not in abstracto, as mere collections of propositions, but as embedded in the concrete mental life of inquirers. To be probative, an argument must not only be sound in the standard text-book sense of
having true premises and a valid form, but must also satisfy at least three
further conditions: it must be free of informal fallacy, exhibit a conclusion
relevant to its premises, and have premises that are known to be to be true
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by the "consumer" of the argument. Thus the OA from possibility will be
probative for a person only if its crucial premise, "The ens realissimum is
possible," is known to be true by the person in question. To say that the CA
depends for its probativeness on the OA from possibility, then, is to say that
the CA cannot be probative for a person unless the OA from possibility is
probative for the same person. In particular, my claim of probativenessdependence implies that the CA cannot be probative for a person unless the
crucial OA premise, "The ER is possible," is known to be true by the person,
and indeed, known to be true independently of the CA. In other words, if I
am right in my dependency claim, then the crucial OA premise is not a
proposition one can come to know by enacting the CA; it is rather a proposition the truth of which one must presuppose in order to attain the CA's
conclusion. (To enact an argument is to think it through, to realize it in a
series of concrete mental episodes.) At most, the CA establishes, in its first
half, the existence of the ens necessarium (EN); but it cannot "go the distance"
and establish that the EN is the ER. Although the EN is an unconditionally
necessary being, there is nothing in its concept to require its identification
with God, the maximally real, i.e., maximally perfect being. For a cosmological arguer to identify the EN with the ER, as opposed to other epistemically possible candidates, he must know that the ER is metaphysically possible; but if he knows this, he has what he needs to enact a probative OA
from possibility. But then the CA's appeal to experience, to the contingent
fact that the world exists, tums out to be both superfluous and unavailing.
Superfluous, because the cosmological arguer may simply "run" an OA
from possibility and forget about the CA. Unavailing, because the ER cannot be proven from any contingent fact. Thus I vindicate Kant's thesis that
the CA stands and falls with the OA: if the latter is not probative, then the
CA cannot be either. To do this, however, I have had to make an unKantian distinction between the OA aus {auter Begriffen and the OA aus der
Moeglichkeit, a distinction which is crucial in any case if we are to take the
OA seriously, but one ruled out by Kant's ill-starred conceptualism.
One problem Forgie has is with understanding why a cosmological
arguer must make use of the knowledge that the ER is possible in the
process of completing the CA. Since I did a poor job of explaining this in
my article, let me try again here.
Let us suppose that the first half of the CA establishes the existence of an
unconditionally necessary being upon which everything contingent
depends. What the properties of this ens necessarium (EN) are cannot be
decided by the CA's first half since this is merely an inference a contingentia
mundi to some necessary ground or other. We may say that the conclusion
of the first half of the CA merely "advertises a position," that of EN; the
task, however, is to find a suitable candidate to fill the position. The cosmological arguer must therefore abandon experience at this point and ask: of
all epistemically possible candidate beings, which being has a nature that
could qualify it to exist of absolute necessity?3 The traditional answer is
that the candidate being has to be the ens realissimum or ens perfectissimum.
This is a being whose perfection is maximal, and whose unconditionally
necessary existence derives from its perfection.
This is the traditional answer, but is it the only one? Suppose the ER turns
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out to be metaphysically impossible. Perhaps the ER's properties are not
really compossible. It would then follow that the EN, which has been
proven to exist, is not the ER. This is an epistemically possible state of
affairs: it is possible, for all the cosmological arguer can claim to know, that
while the EN exists, the ER is impossible. Therefore, to establish that the EN
is the ER, it must be assumed by the cosmological arguer that the ER is metaphysically possible, that its properties are really compossible. Since this is a
proposition that must be assumed, it is not one that can be deduced as a conclusion of the CA, neither of its first half, nor of its second. Not of the first
half, since no appeal to experience could be relevant to the compossibility of
the ER's attributes. Not of the second half, since the knowledge that the ER
is pO:-5sible is a prerequisite for the identification of the EN with the ER.
Of course, there might be a proof of the compossibility of the ER's attributes. But any such proof would be part of a probative OA from possibility,
and no part of any cosmological argument, the characteristic feature of
which is the appeal to experience.
Therefore, if the CA is to be probative, the cosmological arguer must
know it to be true that the ER is metaphysically possible. To put it another
way, the cosmological arguer must know that the epistemic possibility that
the ER is metaphysically impossible is merely epistemic and not real. But
he cannot know this on the basis of any cosmological argumentation. So
the cosmological arguer, to achieve his argumentative goal, must presuppose that the ER is metaphysically possible. To presuppose this, however,
is to presuppose the crucial premise of the OA from possibility. One may
therefore simply argue from this premise in the familiar ontological way to
the existence of the ER, thus bypassing and rendering superfluous what is
characteristic of the CA, namely, the a posteriori appeal to the contingent
fact that something exists.
Ute whole problem is this: how can it be proven that the EN is God? The
EN must have properties that qualify it for necessary existence, and it is reasonable to think that only the ER could have such properties. But reasonableness does not amount to proof. For there are other epistemically possible candidates for the role of EN. As Kant points out, a being that is not an ens realissimum might yet possess absolute necessity: " .. .it by no means follows that the
concept of a limited being which does not have the highest reality is for that
reason incompatible with absolute necessity."4 Here is my own example of
the logical gap between the EN and the ER. In Plotinus' Enneads (VI, 9, I), we
read that "It is by the One that all beings are beings."s We may interpret this
to mean that the One is the unconditionally necessary S'Tound of the existence
of each contingent existent. The One is therefore a candidate for the job of
EN. Now if the EN is the Plotinian One, then the EN is not God. The One is
neither personal nor impersonal, but God is personal. The One is not an intellective existence (Enneads VI, 9, 6)/ but God is. The One is not a Thou that we
can address and be addressed by; God is. As ens realissimum, God is completely determined in that it he has "one out of each possible pair of opposed
predicates."7 But the One is not an ens realissimum. An ens realissimum is a
being that enfolds within itself eminently all of the positive attributes (perfections) that we encounter here below in disjointed and limited fashion. The
Plotinian One, however, is conceived Hindu style as "neti, neti" (not this, not
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that), as lying beyond all possible predication. It does not have one of each
pair of opposed predicates. It is huer to say that it has neither of each pair.
(Quibble with this interpretation of Plotinus, and I will simply introduce a
character called "Pseudo-Plotinus" and use him to make my case.)
In my estimation, then, Kant had a profound insight into the dependency of the CA on the OA, an insight which, when properly set forth with the
help of some un-Kantian distinctions, survives Forgie's penetrating critique of the dependency of the CA on the OA from mere concepts.
II. Replies to Forgie's Counterarguments

Forgie thinks that the argumentation in support of my dependency thesis
"proves too much" in that, if correct, it would render superfluous any
number of arguments that are clearly not superfluous. He offers three
examples. I will take them in an order different from that in which he presents them, and show that the first two are not rendered superfluous by
my argumentation strategy, while the third is, but innocuously so.
An argument from evil. Suppose someone gives an argument from evil for
the nonexistence of God, where God is conceived as an ens realissimum or ens
perfectissimum, a maximally perfect being. Such an argument cannot be sound
unless it is possible that God not exist. For if God necessarily exists, then any
amount of evil in the world will be consistent with the existence of God. Thus
Forgie wlites that the argument from evil "presupposes that God's nonexistence is possible." But then why could not one argue ontologically from the
possibility of God's nonexistence to the actuality of God's nonexistence, thus
bypassing the a posteriori argument from evil and rendering superfluous the
appeal to the contingent fact of evil? The implication, of course, is that my
defense of the dependency of the CA on the OA from possibility extends to
the unsuperfluous argument from evil and thus "proves too much."
It seems clear to me that the argument from evil would not be rendered
superfluous by my approach. The argument from evil does presuppose in a merely logical sense - that God's nonexistence is possible: if that proposition were false, then the argument would not be sound. But this is not to
say that a person who enacts the argument from evil must know that God's
nonexistence is possible in order to arrive at the knowledge that God does
not exist. Let us say that if a person who enacts an argument must know a
certain proposition in order to arrive at knowledge of the argument's conclusion, then the person episternically presupposes the proposition. Given this
definition, it is nonsense to say that an argument epistemically presupposes
a proposition, and this for the simple reason that no argument can enact
itself. The most we can say is that an argument logically presupposes a
proposition when the truth of the proposition is a necessary condition of the
soundness of the argument. Soundness, however, is not our concern; probativeness is. This was made clear early on in my article. The argument
from evil may be soundness-dependent on the argument from the possibility of God's nonexistence, but the former is not probativeness-dependent on
the latter. This is because a person who enacts the argument from evil need
not presuppose - in the epistemic sense alone relevant to my claim of probativeness-dependence - that God's nonexistence is possible. That is, the
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person need not know that God's nonexistence is possible as a condition of
his successfully completing the argument from evil. Far from being an epistemic presupposition of the argument from evil, the proposition that God's
nonexistence is possible is an entailment of the argument in question, and
thus a proposition the enactor of the argument comes to know from the
argument if the argument is probative. Surely there is a big difference
between a proposition the knowledge of which is a prerequisite for the
attainment of an argumentative goal, and a proposition the knowledge of
which is an outcome of the attainment of an argumentative goal.
Now it is precisely this difference that makes the difference between the
CA and the argument from evil. To attain his goal, the cosmological
arguer must epistemically presuppose the proposition that God (the ER) is
possible: knowledge of this proposition is a prerequisite, not an outcome,
of his successful completion of the argument. This is because he cannot
identify the EN with the ER - and thus complete the second half of the
proof - unless he knows that the ER is possible. The arguer from evil,
however, need not epistemically presuppose the proposition that God's
nonexistence is possible. This is something he proves if his argument is
probative. For what is the gist of the argument? It is that evil is a fact, and
that the fact of evil is inconsistent with the existence of a necessary being
who possesses essentially the standard omni-attributes. If this argument is
successful, then it shows that the necessary being in question does not
exist, which is equivalent to showing that God's nonexistence is possible.
It is clear that an enactor of the argument need not invoke or make use of
the truth of "God's nonexistence is possible." He can suspend judgment
with respect to this proposition until after the argument is completed.
Thus we see that my argument strategy is not guilty of probative overreach: it does not extend to the argument from evil. Forgie, however, is
guilty of not taking seriously my carefully articulated distinction of probativeness from soundness. He attributes to me a narrowly logical notion of
presupposition. I admit, however, that I gave aid and comfort to this misattribution by an incautious definition of "presuppose" that I placed in an
endnote on the eve of publication. I felt that I should say something about
my use of "presuppose," but what I said was not to the point. I said that
an argument presupposes a proposition just in case "it has it as an implicit
premise in the absence of which the argument would not be sound."B This
is correct as a definition of logical presupposition, but what I should have
been defining was epistemic presupposition as I did above.
Fermat's Last Theorem. As Forgie notes, this theorem (FLT) has recently
been proven by Andrew Wiles. Forgie points out that "Wiles' argument
presupposes that FLT is possibly true." This is right if "presuppose" is
taken in a logical sense: the argument for FLT cannot be sound unless FLT
is possibly true. So, given that FLT is necessarily true if true, why could
not Wiles have mounted a quick ontological proof of FLT along the lines
of: FLT is possibly true; either FLT is impossibly true or it is necessarily
true; therefore, FLT is necessarily true, thus bypassing and rendering
superfluous the laborious proof he actually gave?
Again, nothing I have said implies that Wiles could have taken the indolent ontological route.to mathematical glory. Although his argument logi-
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cally presupposes that FLT is possibly true, in the sense that the soundness
of his argument entails this proposition, he himself had no need to presuppose epistemically the truth of the proposition in order to complete his
proof successfully. That FLT is possibly true is not something he epistemically presupposes; it is something he proves by proving FLT.
In the case of the CA, however, matters are reversed. That the ER is
possible is not something the cosmological arguer proves; it is a proposition he must epistemically presuppose in order to negotiate the second half
of the CA. For again, the whole difficulty is to identify the EN with the ER,
and this identification cannot be made unless the cosmological arguer can
invoke antecedent knowledge that the ER is possible.
An argument from religious/mystical experience. Suppose it could be shown
that certain religious or mystical experiences could only be explained by
invoking a supernatural cause (SC). This would not amount to a proof of
God unless it could be shown that the SC is the ER. (The SC could be what it
is while lacking one or more of the perfections definitive of the ER.) Thus
two steps would be required, just as in the case of the CA. Forgie rightly
points out that the second step, the argument for the identity of the SC with
the ER, could not be sound unless the ER were possible. He concludes that if
I were right, then one could argue ontologically from the possibility of the
ER to its actuality, thus bypassing and rendering superfluous the argument
from religious / mystical experience. He takes this to show that my approach
cannot be correct, it being clear to him that arguments from religious / mystical experience are not superfluous.
It is important to see that this case is entirely different from the other two,
and that Forgie wrongly lumps them together. In the "evil" case, we have
an a posteriori argument from a contingent fact to the nonexistence of something that exists necessarily if it exists at all. In the "FLT" case, we have an a
priori argument from necessary truths to a necessary truth. Neither of these
are rendered superfluous by the considerations I have adduced, and so
these arguments may be dismissed as red herrings. But in the final example,
we have an a posteriori argument from a contingent fact (the occurrence of
certain experiences) to a necessarily existent cause of their occurrence. Thus
the argument from religious / mystical experience has the same structure as
the CA. So it faces exactly the same difficulty as the CA faces, namely, once
you arrive at an explainer of the contingent fact wanting explanation (the
existence of the world in the one case, the occurrence of certain experiences
in the other), how do you know that this explainer has the divine perfections? How do you know that the EN /SC is the ER?
Generalizing, we may say that every argument that proceeds a posteriori
from a contingent fact and attempts in this manner to establish the existence of an unconditionally necessary being possessing the divine perfections will face the difficulty just mentioned. We arrive at some entity X
which functions as the metaphysical cause or ground of the fact in question; but since we cannot assume that X is maximally perfect, we must
prove this. But at these stratospheric reaches, all we can do is invoke the
possibility of a maximally perfect being. All we can say is that the divine
nature, as maximally perfect, is not possibly such that it does not exist. But
this is just the ontological argument.
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Presumably, Forgie will want to insist that the argument from religious/mystical experience is not superfluous. Well, I am prepared to
admit that it does show that there is a supernatural being (SB), and is useful and independent of the OA to that extent. But although every ER is an
SB, not every SB is an ER. So an enactor of the argument from
religious / mystical experience, in order to negotiate the final step from the
SB to the ER, must epistemically presuppose the possibility of the ER,
assuming that he is out to prove (as opposed to merely make a reasonable
case for) the existence of the ER.
One final point. Forgie thinks that if I am right, then not only the CA and
the argument from religious / mystical experience are superfluous, but also
that "any theistic proof, other than the OA, for a God whose possibility
entails its actuality would be similarly superfluous." This is not correct. All
Forgie is entitled to say is that any theistic proof, other than the OA, that
starts from a contingent fact, for a God whose possibility entails its actuality
would be similarly superfluous. I have published what I call an "onto-cosmological" argument that argues to a God whose possibility entails his
actuality, but does not require as its starting point any contingent facU It
requires only the possibility that there be contingent beings, not the actual
existence of any. A different sort of onto-cosmological argument is Kant's
1763 argument from the noncontingent existence of possibilities (without
which there could be no world) to the existence of God. Whatever these
arguments may be worth, they are not rendered superfluous by the OA. 1O
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